Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Research (GJETR)

The Compliance Gap: Why Audit-Based Cybersecurity Models Fail Critical Infrastructure and the Case for Continuous Control

Amadi, Chukwunenye

10 September 2026 · Vol. 2, Issue 9, pp. 536-562

DOI: 10.65150/EP-gjetr/V2E9/2026-12

Abstract

Critical infrastructure (CI) sectors, including energy, water, transportation, healthcare, telecommunications, and finance, continue to anchor their cybersecurity assurance in periodic, audit-based compliance: scheduled assessments that certify, at a point in time, that mandated controls exist and are documented. This conceptual review argues that this model is structurally incapable of guaranteeing security in modern CI environments and develops the case for a transition to continuous monitoring and continuous control. Drawing on standards literature, empirical studies of operational technology (OT) security, documented attacks on industrial systems, and the continuous auditing tradition in accounting information systems, the paper synthesizes five interlocking failure modes of periodic compliance: (a) the static-snapshot problem, in which audit findings describe a past state rather than the present one; (b) the error-proneness and limited depth of manual, checklist-driven assessment; (c) configuration drift, through which compliant systems silently degrade between audits; (d) the asymmetry between adversary operational tempo and annual or multi-year audit cycles; and (e) an audit-centric organizational culture that substitutes evidence production for risk reduction. The analysis situates these failures against a threat landscape defined by IT/OT convergence, industrial Internet of Things expansion, deep infrastructure interdependencies, nation-state pre-positioning, and ransomware economics. The paper then traces the intellectual and regulatory lineage of the alternative (continuous auditing, information security continuous monitoring, continuous diagnostics and mitigation, zero trust architecture, and emerging continuous control validation) and discusses implications for regulators, operators, and researchers. The compliance gap, it concludes, is not a maturity deficit but a design flaw requiring an architectural response. As a conceptual review the paper offers an analytic framework rather than an effect estimate: it presents no new data and does not establish that continuous regimes reduce realized risk relative to periodic ones, a limitation stated in full in Section 7.

Keywords: critical infrastructure, audit-based compliance, continuous monitoring, configuration drift, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, operational technology security

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Amadi, & Chukwunenye (2026). The Compliance Gap: Why Audit-Based Cybersecurity Models Fail Critical Infrastructure and the Case for Continuous Control. Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Research, 2(9), 536-562. https://doi.org/10.65150/EP-gjetr/V2E9/2026-12

@article{Amadi2026,
  title   = {The Compliance Gap: Why Audit-Based Cybersecurity Models Fail Critical Infrastructure and the Case for Continuous Control},
  author  = {Amadi and Chukwunenye},
  journal = {Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Research},
  year    = {2026},
  volume  = {2},
  number  = {9},
  pages   = {536-562},
  doi     = {10.65150/EP-gjetr/V2E9/2026-12},
  url     = {https://doi.org/10.65150/EP-gjetr/V2E9/2026-12}
}

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